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Computational approaches to the pragmatics problem 1 
Abstract 2 
Unlike many aspects of human language, pragmatics involves a systematic many-to-many 3 
mapping between form and meaning.  This renders the computational problems of encoding 4 
and decoding meaning especially challenging, both for humans in normal conversation and 5 
for artificial dialogue systems that need to understand their users’ input.  A particularly 6 
striking example of this difficulty is the recognition of speech act or dialogue act types.  In 7 
this review, we discuss why this is a problem, and why its solution is potentially relevant both 8 
for our understanding of human interaction and for the implementation of artificial systems.  9 
We examine some of the theoretical and practical attempts that have been made to overcome 10 
this problem, and consider how the field might develop in the near future. 11 
Introduction 12 
What constitutes human communication?  One possible answer is to claim that it requires a 13 
sender and a recipient, and that information is encoded by the sender, transmitted, and 14 
decoded by the recipient.  This concept of communication was famously formalised by 15 
Shannon (1948).  However, Grice (1957) argued that communication between people was 16 
also characterised by the process of intention recognition.  Specifically, he identified the 17 
notion of “non-natural meaning”, in which sense a speaker “means” something if, firstly, they 18 
intend to induce a belief in the hearer as a consequence of that utterance, and secondly, they 19 
intend for this to happen as a result of the hearer recognising the intention (conveyed by the 20 
utterance) to bring about this belief.  For instance, a speaker who says “Please sit down” 21 
intends for the hearer to sit down, and for this to occur because the hearer recognises that this 22 
is what the speaker wants to convey by these words.  From this perspective, as Levinson 23 
(1983: 15) puts it, “communication involves the notions of intention and agency”. 24 
Grice’s view of inter-personal communication has been enormously influential in linguistic 25 
pragmatics and related fields.  A striking point of contrast with the Shannon model, as Grice 26 
himself immediately noted (1957: 387), is that the intentional view of communication admits 27 
the possibility of indeterminacy.  On the Gricean view, it is possible for the same signal to 28 
correspond to different intentions, in which case it is necessary to appeal to context in order 29 
to understand what the speaker actually intends on this particular occasion.  Shannon, 30 
conversely, adopts a model in which encoding and decoding of a signal are one-to-one 31 
mapping processes, and in which context and the mental state of the sender are irrelevant to 32 
the recipient’s understanding of the message. 33 
It seems undeniable that human communication does indeed have the systematic ambiguity 34 
that Grice posits, whether this is a consequence of the polysemy of words or the multi-35 
functional nature of various actions: Grice’s own examples are the word ‘pump’ and the 36 
action of putting one’s hand in a pocket.  So clearly some elaboration of the Shannon model 37 
is called for.  And intuitively, it seems credible that the goal of the hearer is to understand the 38 
intention of the speaker, as Grice argues.  However, given that many different intentions may 39 
be realised by the same signal, the task of recovering the speaker’s intention given a signal is 40 
logically intractable (Levinson 1995: 231) – there is not enough information in the signal to 41 
tell the hearer, precisely and unambiguously, what the intention was.  In order for the 42 
Gricean, intentional analysis of communication to be tenable, we therefore need to be able to 43 
explain how hearers are so often successful in solving this ‘pragmatics problem’, and 44 
understanding what intention underlies the speaker’s choice of utterance. Given the 45 
ramifications of this model for our understanding of human interaction, foundational 46 
questions about the validity of the model are of substantial theoretical importance.  47 
In this paper, we focus on a particular subcase of the pragmatics problem that has attracted 48 
widespread interest from philosophers of language and builders of computational systems 49 
alike: namely, the way in which we identify dialogue act types.  The following section 50 
discusses why this is an important issue for both human-human interactions and for artificial 51 
spoken dialogue systems.  We then outline some of the most productive linguistic and 52 
computational attempts to address this issue.  We conclude by considering how these 53 
methods might usefully be synthesised into a coherent interdisciplinary approach to dialogue 54 
act type recognition. 55 
Dialogue act recognition in interaction 56 
As pointed out by Austin (1962), our use of language does not just consist of asserting 57 
propositions.  More broadly, we perform “speech acts”.  That is to say, we “do things with 58 
words” – we use utterances to achieve particular effects.  We may request an action, 59 
acknowledge a request, ask for information, and so on.  From this perspective, we can see 60 
language as a tool that we can use in order to accomplish things that we would not be able to 61 
accomplish by other forms of physical action.  We can also analyse individual instances of 62 
language use as social actions that are performed in order to elicit specific responses, which 63 
might involve obtaining information or causing interlocutors to act upon the physical world 64 
in particular ways. 65 
The usefulness of linguistic acts in enabling specific social accomplishments cannot easily be 66 
treated in terms of truth conditions: it doesn’t generally make sense to describe a request as 67 
“true” or “false”, for instance.  Austin introduced the notion of “illocutionary act” to describe 68 
this kind of function, a notion which was later elaborated by Searle (1975).  Although this 69 
research tradition is referred to as speech act theory, here we will use the term “dialogue act” 70 
rather than “speech act” to emphasise that the relevant actions may be achieved by other 71 
means than through speech (for instance, gesture, eye-gaze, and so on).  There is little 72 
consensus as to what constitutes an appropriate typology of dialogue acts, but we might 73 
distinguish dialogue act types by appeal to a notion like “what kind of response is 74 
appropriate”. 75 
In order for the speaker’s dialogue act to be effective, it is generally necessary (under the 76 
Gricean assumptions discussed above) for the hearer correctly to identify it, as without doing 77 
so, it is impossible for the hearer to respond in such a way as to satisfy the speaker’s goals.  78 
However, as has long been observed, this is not a straightforward matter.  Consider for 79 
example the potential dialogue act of ‘asking a question’.  Nearly all human languages 80 
possess the interrogative sentence-type, which is usually distinguished from the declarative 81 
by some complex of morphosyntactic and intonational factors.  It is tempting to assume that 82 
the task of recognising the dialogue act ‘asking a question’ is reducible to that of recognising 83 
an interrogative sentence.  But this is simply not true: a formally declarative sentence may 84 
perform a questioning function (“You’ll let me know”), and a formally interrogative sentence 85 
may function as a request (“Could you close the window?”)  Indeed, interrogative forms can 86 
easily be ambiguous between various dialogue act types depending on context (“Can you 87 
come?” could be a question, a request or an invitation).  Moreover, the notion of ‘asking a 88 
question’ might not even constitute a single coherent dialogue act type: it might include such 89 
distinct dialogue acts as ‘asking a polar question’, ‘asking a wh- question’, ‘asking a check 90 
question’, and so on.  If these need to be distinguished, that clearly cannot rely on appeal to 91 
the sentence-type alone, which is typically the same (interrogative) in all cases. 92 
The recognition of dialogue act types can thus be seen as a specific case of intention 93 
recognition, and one that succumbs to the pragmatics problem: given that several different 94 
intentions may be expressed by the same form, how can the hearer locate the right one?  And 95 
just as we ask this question for human interactors, so we can ask it for artificial systems, and 96 
in particular spoken dialogue systems – that is, systems that are designed to converse with 97 
humans.  To get computers to understand one another, we can program them to communicate 98 
unambiguously: but the ultimate goal for a spoken dialogue system is to be able to 99 
accommodate all the ambiguity and uncertainty of normal human discourse.  (In practice, 100 
humans tend to adjust their choice of words to match the abilities of artificial systems (see 101 
Branigan et al. 2011), but ideally this would not be necessary.)  Moreover, the system must 102 
understand what the speaker is actually trying to achieve, rather than merely formalising the 103 
content of the speaker’s utterance in some way.  This kind of understanding also proves 104 
useful in enabling the system correctly to identify individual words that would otherwise not 105 
have been correctly parsed (Stolcke et al. 2000, Taylor et al. 2000).  In order to allow systems 106 
of this kind to approach human performance levels, it would be helpful to have a fuller and 107 
clearer account of how humans actually recognise dialogue act types. 108 
A growing body of evidence underscores the impressive nature of human performance in this 109 
particular domain.  Our own experience suggests that competent language users are able 110 
correctly to identify the intended dialogue act in the vast majority of cases, as shown by the 111 
appropriateness of their responses.  For instance, a hearer asked “Could you pass the salt?” 112 
will usually do so, unless they deliberately choose to misinterpret the speaker’s intention and 113 
merely say “Yes”.  In cases such as this, the formal ambiguity of the utterance is not 114 
necessarily noticed by the dialogue participants, unless it is pointed out by a response that is 115 
inappropriate to the speaker’s actual intention. 116 
The success of dialogic communication speaks to the accuracy of the conclusions arrived at 117 
by hearers about the speakers’ intentions.  Experimental work suggests that hearers are not 118 
only accurate but also remarkably fast in identifying the speaker’s intention in ongoing 119 
utterances.  Relevant evidence here comes from turn-taking.  De Ruiter, Mitterer and Enfield 120 
(2006) demonstrated that, in spontaneous Dutch conversation, almost half of the new 121 
conversational turns started within 250ms (either way) of the end of the current turn.  Stivers 122 
et al. (2009) generalised this result to a typologically mixed sample of 10 languages: for each 123 
language, the mean duration of the gap between turns was less than half a second, the 124 
“fastest” being Japanese with a mean gap of just 7ms.  This supports the observation by 125 
Levinson (1995: 237) that a half-second delay in responding can (in English) be interpreted 126 
as conveying some pragmatic effect (in that case, the impossibility of the hearer responding 127 
‘yes’ to a question).   128 
Recent work on dialogue act recognition (Gisladottir et al. 2012) demonstrates directly that 129 
hearers are able accurately to identify dialogue acts off-line.  Hence, given the content of a 130 
speaker’s turn (and awareness of the contrast), it should not be a problem for the hearer to 131 
identify the speaker’s dialogue act type.  However, it seems profoundly implausible that this 132 
could happen in the gaps between turns documented by Stivers et al. (2009).  In the first 133 
place, many of the languages they test exhibit frequent overlap in turn transitions, which 134 
indicates that hearers cannot be waiting for the speaker’s turn to be complete before they start 135 
planning their own conversational response.  In the second place, research on utterance 136 
planning (for instance, Brown-Schmidt and Tanenhaus 2006) appears to indicate that even a 137 
latency of 500ms would not be enough for the hearer even to formulate a response ab initio.  138 
Given that the responses are usually faster than this, usually pertinent, and usually conform to 139 
the dialogic strictures laid down by the speaker (for instance, a question will be met with an 140 
answer), this strongly suggests that the hearer must often be aware of the nature of the 141 
speaker’s dialogue act before it is complete. 142 
In a similar vein, we might interpret the nature of back-channel responses (Yngve 1970) as 143 
evidence that the hearer can identify aspects of the speaker’s communicative intention 144 
incrementally and on-line.  Back-channel responses are utterances by the hearer that are not 145 
attempts to initiate a turn.  Schegloff (1982) refers to a subset of these as “continuers”, on the 146 
basis that they serve to assure the speaker of the hearer’s attention and indicate that the turn 147 
can continue.  Various utterances can fulfil this function, among them “uh-huh” and “yeah”.  148 
However, it appears likely that the appropriate choice of back-channel response depends to a 149 
certain extent upon the dialogue act being performed by the speaker – for instance, “yeah” 150 
would not be an appropriate back-channel if the speaker is formulating a request, unless the 151 
hearer intends to comply (cf. Schegloff 1993: 107).  If this intuition is correct, it further 152 
suggests that hearers may be able to access information about the speaker’s dialogue act type 153 
from relatively early in the utterance. 154 
In sum, there appears to be quite convincing evidence that human dialogue participants are 155 
able to draw rich inferences about dialogue act types from very early on in a dialogue turn.  156 
In the following section, we examine some approaches to explaining how this process might 157 
take place. 158 
Approaches to dialogue act recognition 159 
A linguistic approach to dialogue act recognition was offered by Gazdar (1981), who 160 
formulated the Literal Meaning Hypothesis.  According to this account, every utterance 161 
possesses some kind of illocutionary force that is built into its surface form.  Declaratives are 162 
used to make statements, interrogatives to question, imperatives to order or request, and verbs 163 
such as “promise”, “deny” and so on (performatives, in Austin’s terms) are used to 164 
accomplish whichever function their verb specifies.  However, as discussed earlier, utterances 165 
are frequently used to accomplish other discourse functions than their surface form would 166 
suggest, and the same utterance may be used for multiple functions.  So at the very least we 167 
need to supplement the Literal Meaning Hypothesis with some mechanism that enables 168 
hearers to calculate the alternative non-literal or “indirect” meanings that may arise. 169 
One possibility is to appeal to traditional pragmatic notions of cooperativity and, in 170 
particular, relevance.  Gordon and Lakoff (1971) suggest that reanalysis occurs when the 171 
hearer realises that the surface meaning of the utterance is inappropriate given the context.  172 
For instance, a speaker asking “Could you pass the salt?” typically knows that the hearer is 173 
able to do so, and the hearer can infer from this that the purpose of the utterance is not to 174 
enquire as to their salt-passing capabilities. For the utterance not to be a waste of effort, 175 
therefore, there must be some other purpose to it.  Searle (1975) tells a slightly different 176 
story: on his account, the ‘natural’ answer to the question “Could you pass the salt?” (namely: 177 
yes, the hearer could do so) must be relevant to the speaker.  A possible reason for this is that 178 
the speaker wants the salt; and the hearer, being cooperative, should therefore pass the salt to 179 
the speaker, without an explicit request being necessary. 180 
Can we, however, reconcile this kind of account with the data on turn-taking discussed 181 
above?  Timing presents a serious problem.  Both versions of the pragmatic account take as 182 
their starting point the realisation that the literal meaning of the utterance is in some way 183 
inadequate given the conversational context, and has to be enriched.  However, if the 184 
reasoning in the previous section is correct, this process has to begin before the utterance is 185 
complete.  The problem is, how can the hearer determine that the literal meaning of the 186 
utterance is inadequate before knowing what the utterance is?  A sentence beginning “Could 187 
you…”, or even “Could you pass…”, could certainly be a genuine question that was not a 188 
request (“Could you pass for 21?”).  More generally, we might observe that almost any 189 
sentence beginning “Could you…” might conceivably be used either as a question or as a 190 
request, and for many such cases, it is easy to imagine contexts in which either use might be 191 
intended (“Could you teach a course in psycholinguistics?”)  In order to know that “Could 192 
you pass the salt?” cannot (normally) be intended as a question about the hearer’s 193 
capabilities, the hearer must identify the meaning of the sentence and realise that the speaker 194 
knows the answer to the question that is ostensibly being posed.  This is completely 195 
reasonable post hoc, but as an account of online reasoning it doesn’t appear to give the hearer 196 
enough time to formulate their response.  197 
One conceivable way of rescuing this account is to propose that the hearer in fact guesses 198 
how the sentence will end, and reasons on the basis of that guess, thus being able to draw the 199 
inferences discussed above before the end of the speaker’s turn.  After all, Sacks, Schegloff 200 
and Jefferson (1974) proposed that hearers anticipate the end of speakers’ turns in order to 201 
achieve smooth transitions; and Magyari and De Ruiter (2012) provide evidence that the 202 
accuracy of this anticipation is correlated with the rapidity of turn transition.  However, as an 203 
account of dialogue act type recognition, this explanation is in danger of becoming circular: a 204 
hearer may well guess that the sentence “Could you pass…” concludes with the words “the 205 
salt”, but this continuation only makes sense if the utterance is a request, whereas by 206 
hypothesis the hearer currently takes the utterance to be a question.  To put it another way: 207 
intuitively, we might expect the words “the salt” because we guess that the speaker wants the 208 
salt passed to them.  But how did we guess that the speaker wanted something passed to 209 
them?  Presumably because “Could you pass…” tends to signal that this is the case, 210 
notwithstanding that it is formally part of an interrogative sentence-form. 211 
An alternative approach, foreshadowed by Levinson (1983), is to dispense with the Literal 212 
Meaning Hypothesis, and instead treat the identification of dialogue act type as a puzzle to be 213 
solved by any means available.  That is not to propose that the hearer ignores the sentence-214 
type: that might be a valuable clue to the dialogue act type.  However, according to Levinson, 215 
most speech acts are indirect, in the sense that they do not correspond to the surface form of 216 
the sentence.  Fortunately, there are many other forms of information that might be helpful to 217 
the hearer.  Within the speech signal itself, other indications of the likely dialogue act type 218 
are present.  These include the prosody, as discussed by Bolinger (1964) and extensively 219 
explored by Shriberg et al. (1998) among many others.  It is also likely that specific lexical 220 
choices are strongly associated with particular dialogue acts.  For instance, “I want you to…” 221 
strongly suggests that the current sentence has the character of a request, even though the 222 
sentence-type is purely declarative. Even more generally, the use of “please” seems typically 223 
to mark a request whether it is appended to a declarative (“The door should be closed, 224 
please”), imperative (“Close the door, please”) or interrogative (“Could you close the door, 225 
please?”) sentence-type. 226 
At a higher level, there are considerations deriving from the structure of dialogue, as studied 227 
within the research tradition of conversation analysis: for instance, the idea of adjacency pairs 228 
(Schegloff and Sacks 1973).  If the preceding dialogue turn was a question, the current turn is 229 
likely to be an answer, even if its form suggests otherwise.  If the previous turn was an offer, 230 
the current turn is likely to involve accepting or declining that offer.  Thus, when we 231 
encounter the first turn of an adjacency pair, we might (with some degree of confidence) 232 
expect that the second turn of that pair will follow.  Adjacency pairs can also have non-233 
linguistic constituents, as argued by Schegloff (1968).  Clark (2004) originates the notion of 234 
‘projective pair’ to cover cases where a non-linguistic communicative act such as a gesture 235 
serves to trigger a particular kind of communicative act in response.  He later argues (Clark 236 
2012) that we can identify wordless exchanges that are analysable as question-answer 237 
sequences.  At a still higher level of discourse organisation, an awareness of the overarching 238 
purpose of the dialogue and of the participants’ roles in it might help a hearer disambiguate 239 
dialogue act types.  In a restaurant, for instance, if a customer states the names of dishes, this 240 
is likely to be a request; if a waiter does so, it is more likely to be an offer (or effectively a 241 
multiple-choice question).   242 
Computational implementations of dialogue act recognition have predominantly adopted this 243 
kind of permissive, inclusive approach, in which all available forms of information are used 244 
to make the relevant decisions.  This cue-based approach essentially dispenses with the 245 
assumption of literal meaning elaborated by the kind of stepwise inference discussed earlier, 246 
although that approach has also been explored computationally (from Perrault and Allen 1980 247 
to Allen et al. 2007).  The role of the cue-based model is simply to identify which dialogue 248 
act is instantiated by a given utterance, appealing as necessary to lexical, syntactic, prosodic 249 
and conversational-structural factors, among others. 250 
It would perhaps be fair to say that cue-based implementations are primarily focused on 251 
improving the performance of systems, rather than necessarily providing insights into the 252 
process of dialogue act recognition per se.  However, the models are linguistically informed, 253 
in important respects.  They are trained on labelled corpora, from which they can learn the 254 
strengths of association between specific signals and specific dialogue acts.  The choice of 255 
signals may, and typically does, reflect empirically-determined findings as to which aspects 256 
of the utterance are likely to constitute informative cues.  Identifying potentially useful 257 
signals is a non-trivial problem in domains such as prosody, where it is unclear precisely 258 
what properties of the acoustic pattern have informational value (see for example Rangarajan 259 
Sridhar, Bangalore and Narayanan 2009). 260 
Although traditional linguistics and computational modelling approaches find common cause 261 
when it comes to identifying signals, the customary meaning of ‘dialogue act’ varies 262 
significantly between the two traditions.  As Thomson (2010: 10) puts it, “In the traditional 263 
definitions of both speech and dialogue acts, the semantic information is completely 264 
separated from the act”.  That is to say, the utterance “Could you pass the salt?” is an instance 265 
of a dialogue act type like REQUEST rather than one like REQUEST-SALT.  From a linguistic 266 
point of view, the motivation for this is fairly clear: the notion of dialogue act type captures 267 
the idea that there are commonalities between all forms of REQUEST, regardless of what is 268 
being requested.  However, from a dialogue systems standpoint, this is not necessarily an 269 
advantage.  If the goal of the system is to fulfil the user’s request, then merely identifying the 270 
utterance as ‘some kind of request’ is not helpful: it does not enable the system to formulate a 271 
response, as this response will depend upon what is being requested.  Unless the system has 272 
an abstract understanding of how to fulfil generic requests, the ‘type’ level of dialogue acts is 273 
not useful here. 274 
Moreover, by dispensing with the ‘type’ level, it may be possible for a system to identify 275 
dialogue acts more efficiently than a human could.  Consider the case of a robot receptionist 276 
(as implemented, for example, by Paek and Horvitz 2000).  Suppose that John Smith is an 277 
employee at the company and that the robot is programmed with only one action that relates 278 
to John Smith, namely putting a call through to him.  Confronted with the input “Could you 279 
call John Smith?”, the robot can use the words “John Smith” as a cue to the action it should 280 
take, and thus use the name as evidence that it should put a call through.  A more capable 281 
robot, just like a human, would be disadvantaged here, because if it could take various 282 
different actions with respect to John Smith, recognising the name would not suffice to 283 
identify which one should be performed.  Of course, the simple robot may misidentify 284 
dialogue acts that are outside its knowledge base (“My name is John Smith”), but it has no 285 
problem using lexical cues to choose among its limited repertoire of abilities. 286 
The question arises of whether the traditional notion of dialogue act type is at all helpful for 287 
implementations of spoken dialogue systems.  Traum (1999) considers this point, coming to 288 
the conclusion that dialogue act types may not be strictly necessary but are potentially useful 289 
as an intermediate step in communication planning.  The practice of identifying dialogue acts 290 
at a finer level of granularity (REQUEST-SALT, CALL-JOHN-SMITH) certainly has implications 291 
for the scalability of dialogue systems, as the number of distinct dialogue acts increases 292 
drastically as the coverage of the system expands to multiple conversational domains 293 
(whereas, by hypothesis, the number of dialogue act types is relatively small even for the 294 
whole of human interaction).  This becomes especially pertinent when we consider 295 
statistically-driven dialogue systems of the kind surveyed by Young et al. (2013).  These 296 
models use the approach named POMDP (partially observable Markov decision processes) 297 
and treat dialogue as a Markov process, in which transitions between dialogue states are 298 
modelled probabilistically. Even within a small domain, it is impractical to track dialogue 299 
state fully in such a model; for a general spoken dialogue system, the resulting state space 300 
would be intractably large (Young et al. 2010: 152).   301 
In particular, a domain-general system that identified highly specific dialogue acts would 302 
necessarily have to incorporate thousands of distinct dialogue acts.  Consider the receptionist 303 
scenario: a person entering the building might request the receptionist to make a call to any 304 
individual in the building, using the form of words “Could you call X?”  A system that treats 305 
every such request completely separately, depending on the identity of X, could not make 306 
useful generalisations across this set of requests.  For instance, if the name of X is mumbled 307 
or unfamiliar, it will not be able to respond “Sorry, who?” unless it identifies the utterance as 308 
a request: it could only announce its inability to respond to the request as a whole, which 309 
might prompt futile reformulations (“I would like to talk to X”).  That is, although such a 310 
system might be very efficient at learning the mappings between specific strings and specific 311 
tasks, it will struggle to generalise these mappings in any remotely human-like way.  312 
Similarly, if it is possible to make generalisations about dialogue act sequences (e.g. 313 
question-answer, apology-acceptance, check-confirmation, and so on), these generalisations 314 
will not be as evident when the coarse-grained dialogue act types are broken down into fine-315 
grained ones.i  If each particular kind of apology must be separately associated with a kind of 316 
acceptance, a large volume of data may be required for the pattern to be learnt by the system 317 
across all pertinent occasions. 318 
However, this observation, like Traum’s (1999) discussion, relates primarily to the operation 319 
of relatively complex dialogue agents with sophisticated ‘mental’ states.  For simpler 320 
systems, dialogue act type recognition in the traditional sense is clearly less useful: in the 321 
limiting case, if a system does nothing but (attempt to) satisfy requests, coding a module to 322 
identify every input as a REQUEST is clearly not going to add anything to the system’s 323 
efficacy.  What the system needs to do is to identify what is being requested: only then can it 324 
initiate the appropriate response behaviour.  Unless the system has a generic handling 325 
procedure for requests, it cannot benefit from the inclusion of this additional level of analysis.  326 
By contrast, systems that actually attempt to emulate human behaviour have the potential to 327 
benefit from including a dialogue act level.  A recent example of such a system the virtual 328 
agent implemented by DeVault, Sagae and Traum (2011), designed to help soldiers practice 329 
negotiation skills.  The agent uses a natural language understanding module to convert the 330 
content of the human user’s utterance into a semantic frame representation.  One of the 331 
attributes within this semantic frame is ‘speech act type’, so the artificial agent could be said 332 
to be calculating and exploiting information about the human speaker’s purpose.  Moreover, 333 
the agent can be configured to guess the content of the semantic frame based on partial 334 
utterances, thus effectively engaging in incremental identification of dialogue act type.   335 
The catch, however, is that semantic frames are treated as atomic within DeVault et al.’s 336 
model, even though they are decomposable in principle.  That is, their model postulates a 337 
finite set of semantic frames and aims to identify, based on the user’s utterance, which one is 338 
currently being instantiated by the speaker.  Each semantic frame happens to have an attribute 339 
that is called ‘speech act type’, but this specific attribute is not exploited in any way: 340 
responses are selected based upon the entire semantic frame that is identified.  There is, in 341 
effect, no commonality between semantic frames that contain the same speech act type.  The 342 
decision to treat semantic frames as atomic reflects a deliberate simplification, justified on the 343 
basis that it does not impair performance on the constrained domain in which the model 344 
operates.  However, for the model to be scalable, some form of non-atomic approach would 345 
be necessary, which might involve the exploitation of dialogue act types in a more traditional 346 
way. 347 
Towards an interdisciplinary perspective on dialogue act recognition 348 
As the above discussion indicates, insights from theoretical linguistics have already been 349 
brought to bear productively upon the implementation of artificial spoken dialogue systems.  350 
However, our psycholinguistic questions about the process of dialogue act recognition and 351 
behaviours such as turn-taking are not directly addressed by this practical computational 352 
work.  Most of the computational work has so far taken place in highly constrained domains, 353 
while we are interested in the full sweep of human communicative interaction.  Moreover, 354 
computational approaches have predominantly attempted to achieve effective behaviour by 355 
any means necessary, but this may involve means that are not available to, or not exploited 356 
by, human interactors.  For instance, computational models do not have the working memory 357 
limitations of humans, and can in principle use probabilistic cues that are outside of humans’ 358 
knowledge (for instance, because they involve relations over too long a distance, or patterns 359 
that humans are not disposed to spot).  They do not have the experiential limitations of 360 
humans: they can be trained on larger corpora than a human would ever experience.  And 361 
they typically do not operate under the same time pressure as humans, assuming that they can 362 
initiate responses faster than humans can program their own motor functions. 363 
Nevertheless, the application of these methods already gives us a useful insight into what 364 
might work, and which theoretical ideas add value in a practical context.  For instance, 365 
Young et al. (2010) use a bigram model of dialogue act type, which is informed by the work 366 
of Schegloff and Sacks (1973) on adjacency pairs, to help identify the user’s response to their 367 
artificial agent’s questions.  DeVault, Sagae and Traum (2011) use a rich array of lexical cues 368 
from the input string to support the semantic classification of the user’s utterances.  As 369 
discussed earlier, this latter model can also be made to operate incrementally, while the 370 
bigram approach of Young et al. also informs us about the likely nature of the current 371 
dialogue act before it is complete.  It would seem quite conceivable to take these 372 
mechanisms, and others like them, equip them with a notion of dialogue act type, and use 373 
them to classify utterances in natural human-human interactions. 374 
Furthermore, if we are interested in learning about how humans treat dialogue acts, we can 375 
calibrate such a model against experimentally verified human behaviour.  That is, we can 376 
eliminate factors that do not appear to influence human performance, just as we can introduce 377 
additional factors that are posited to play a role in humans’ classification of dialogue act 378 
types.  And we can similarly adjust the candidate set of dialogue act types, in accordance with 379 
competing theoretical proposals.  The ultimate goal of such a programme might be to 380 
establish a set of dialogue acts that are descriptively adequate as a characterisation of the 381 
components of human dialogic interaction, and which are identifiable sufficiently quickly by 382 
appeal only to utterance and contextual properties that humans are known to respond to. 383 
Working in the opposite direction, it is also conceivable that a fully adequate theory of 384 
dialogue acts could be very useful in the development of domain-general spoken dialogue 385 
systems.  It is, of course, clear that this is not a substitute for a comprehensive system of 386 
semantics – a system that reliably gives ‘answers’ that don’t relate to the question will not 387 
survive scrutiny – but it may turn out to be a necessary component if dialogue systems are to 388 
behave in a credibly human-like fashion (and thus to allow their human users to behave 389 
normally with them).  It may also transpire that the use of dialogue acts results in systems 390 
being more compact and efficient than would otherwise be the case, just as the analysis of 391 
dialogue reveals order in what might otherwise be the limitless variety of human-human 392 
interaction. 393 
Endnotes 394 
1 The potential to draw useful generalisations will depend not only on defining dialogue act types at 395 
the right level of granularity, but actually choosing an appropriate set of specific dialogue act types 396 
with which to populate the model.  For reasons of space we cannot substantively address this issue 397 
here.  See Král and Cerisara (2010) for a discussion of some specific candidate ‘tag-sets’ for dialogue 398 
acts. 399 
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